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Abstract 
We  propose  a  simple  task  for  the  elicitation  of  risk  attitudes,  initially  used  in  Sabater-Grande  and 
Georgantzís (2002) [SGG], capturing two dimensions of individual decision making:  subjects’ average 
willingness to choose risky projects and their sensitivity towards variations in the return to risk. We 
report results from a large dataset obtained from the test and discuss regularities and the desirability of 
its bi-dimensionality when used to explain behaviour in other contexts.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Testing  for  interdependence  across  different  aspects  of  behavior  requires  jointly  studying 
stated or observed attitudes which are informative on the corresponding individual attributes.
2 
Beyond the question of what explains what in such studies, the search of associations among 
decisions in different tasks is a main motivator for experimentalists. A systematic rejection of 
such associations would confine experimental results to the specific setting in which they were 
obtained, undermining the practical relevance of our research outside the lab.  
In order to produce reliable tests, psychologists invest a substantial amount of effort in (i) 
developing the task and proposing it to the scientific community, (ii) standardizing the format 
and  applying  it  among  large  populations,  (iii)  generating  result  distributions  by  subject 
category, (iv) identifying successful tasks as reliable approximations of an idiosyncratic factor, 
and (v) identifying contexts in which behavior correlates with performance in a given task. This 
process  is  parallel  and  significantly  synergic  to  the  very  important  endeavor  of  producing 
correct theories on the measured aspect itself. However, metaphorically speaking, looking for 
appropriate  tasks  in  the  absence  of  a  perfect  theory  is  like  the  practice  in  medicine  of 
establishing  clinical  protocols  for  the  cure  of  a  disease  even  before  the  disease  is  fully 
understood.  
This paper is inspired by the surprising observation that the process with which the existing 
tests of risk attitudes in economic domains are chosen and used totally ignores stages (ii) and 
(iii) above, while (i), (iv) and (v) are rarely performed in an intentional and systematic way. 
Economists usually aim at testing theories, rather than at relating risk attitudes with behavior 
in other contexts. Even the need for external risk measurements is often not recognized by 
some economists
3, often explaining the effect of risk preferences on observed behavior by 
theoretically deriving the sufficient conditions for this effect to emerge, thus explaining fact Y  
by its sufficient (but not necessary) condition  X .  
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews economic theories 
of risky decision making and comments on some devices used to elicit risk attitudes as an 
external explanatory factor of behavior in other contexts. Section 3 reports results obtained 
from the application of the lottery-panel test by Sabater-Grande and Georgantzís (2002), SGG. 
Section 4 concludes. In a longer working paper, we provide more information on the design of 
the test, as well as instructions for subjects and the experimenter.
4  
                                                           
2  For  example,  when  studying  the  effects  of  psychometric  intelligence  on  complex  decisions, 
psychologists  correlate  scores  in,  say,  Raven  (1976)’s  Advanced  Progressive  Matrices  (APM),  and 
performance in complex microworlds, like NEWFIRE or COLDSTORE. On this, Rigas, Carling and Brehmer 
(2002) note that performance in APM and each one of these complex tasks correlate because they 
provide different measurements of intelligence. 
3 Some famous examples of inferring risk attitudes without using an external risk elicitation task are Cox 
and Oaxaca (1996), inferring risk attitudes from bidding in private value auctions, Goeree, Holt and 
Palfrey (1999) whose data are from laboratory matching pennies games and Campo, Guerre, Perrigne 
and Vuong (2002) on real timber auctions. 
4 García-Gallego, Georgantzís, Jaramillo-Gutiérrez and Parravano (2010). 3 
 
2.  Theories and tests of risk attitudes 
 
An early explanation of why subjects do not evaluate risky choices by their mathematical 
expectation is attributed to the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) by von Neuman and Morgestern 
(1944). According to the theory, when comparing a lottery  11 11 1 , ( x p L = € n n x p 1 1 , ;... €) with 
21 21 2 , ( x p L = € m m x p 2 2 , ;... €), where  ji p
 
is the probability that the  i th best outcome of 
lottery  j occurs, yielding a reward of  ij x €, an agent whose utility is  ) (x U , with  0 (*) ' > U , 
will strongly prefer  1 L  to  2 L , as long as  












1 1 ) ( ) ( .  
The preference for less risky projects is then explained by a negative second derivative of
) (x U ,  implying  a  decreasing  marginal  utility  from  money,  a  condition  often  used  as 
synonymous  to  risk  aversion.  Despite  its  survival  as  the  main  paradigm  in  economics  as 
observed by Rabin and Thaler (2001), the EUT was proved to be an incorrect descriptive model 
since Allais’ (1953) paradox, emerging when subjects are faced to alternative lottery pairs with 
same probability/reward ratios. According to (1), such lotteries should be ranked in the same 
way, whereas people systematically change their choice in favor of the certain payoff when 
this becomes part of the feasible set. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed an alternative 
model, Prospect Theory (PT), assuming that people implicitly use non linear weights  ) (p w  to 
evaluate probabilities. Therefore, in our example,  1 L  would be strongly preferred to  2 L , if: 












1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (  
PT  accommodates  Allais’ paradox, whereas  it  reduces  to  EUT  for  p p w = ) ( .  Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) assumed later a power utility function defined separately over gains and 
losses: 
a x x U = ) (  if  0 > x , and 
b x x U ) ( ) ( - - = l  for  0 < x . So  a and  bare risk aversion 
parameters, and  l  is the coefficient of loss aversion. This new version, called Cumulative 
Prospect  Theory  (CPT),  defines  probability  weighting  over  the  cumulative  probability 
distributions, offering an explanation of risk-loving behavior for payoffs below their reference 
point (losses), while exhibiting risk-averse behavior for rewards above their reference point 
(gains). The form of the probability weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) has been widely used for both separable and cumulative versions of PT, and assumes 
weights  [ ]
g g g g / 1
) 1 ( / ) ( p p p p w - + = . Therefore, in its simplest formulation, CPT explains risk 
attitudes using a minimum of four parameters, a, b, l  and g. Our overview does not pretend 
to narrate the history of economic theories of decision making.
5 We simply want to stress the 
                                                           
5 For example, we have intentionally omitted heuristics and other theories which cannot be used to 
propose tasks for the elicitation of risk attitudes. Also, for space reasons we omit the theory proposed 
by Birnbaum and Navarrete (1998) which can explain violations of stochastic dominance by introducing 4 
 
fact that the evolution of these theories achieves  the aim of accommodating phenomena 
which invalidated earlier theories by the use of more degrees of freedom.   
Contrary to this evolution of theories towards more complete and complex descriptions of 
human  behavior  in  risky  environments,  all  tests  currently  used  are  fundamentally  uni-
dimensional, despite their creation in the post-PT era. This does not mean that all studies of 
behavior under uncertainty have ignored the multi-dimensional approach dictated by modern 
theories.  In  fact,  a  fruitful  line  of  research  has  specifically  designed  and  analyzed  data 
obtaining parameters for utility and probability weighting functions.
6 However, in order to 
produce ready-to-use data, the elicitation of risk attitudes as an explanatory factor of behavior 
in another context should not depend on the parameterization or even the theory used.
7  
A measure of risk aversion is obtained in recent economic studies by the use of the Holt and 
Laury (2002) HL procedure. Although the task was not, initially, proposed as an external risk-
related  task  to  explain  behavior  in  other  contexts,  it  has  served  this  purpose  in  several 
occasions.
8 Due to its uni-dimensionality, costlessly allowing a one-to-one mapping of choices 
on specific utility parameters, the test entails a possible loss of information due to under-
specification of risk attitudes, which is also likely to reduce its power to explain behavior in 
other contexts. This is also true for the whole set of alternative procedures used by economists 
to elicit risk attitudes.
9 The task elicits one individual datum from each block of 10 binary 
choices, designed to obtain the switching point from a less risky to a more risky alternative. 
This  causes  a  practical  problem  since  some  choices  do  not  satisfy  the  “single-switching” 
condition. Posterior applications have opted for different solutions to this problem, leading to 
a variety of alternative implementations which, together with the plethora of designs aimed at 
                                                                                                                                                                          
a third component of risky decision making, namely the attention paid by subjects to the best outcomes 
among those feasible in a given lottery. 
6  Numerous  studies  have  used  experimental  data  to  estimate  the  Tversky  and  Kahneman  (1992) 





1/g  and  Prelec’s  (1998)  two-parameter  specification  w(p)=
g l ) ln ( p e
- - . 
Furthermore, the nonlinearity of responses to probabilities has even been confirmed at the level of 
neural responses by Hsu, Krajbich, Zhao and Camerer (2009), and, for aversive outcomes, by Berns, 
Capra, Chappelow, Moore and Noussair (2008), while it is rejected in a study of neural signals reflecting 
reward uncertainty reported by Schultz et al. (2008).  
7 Mapping choices on parameters of utility and probability weighting functions is further complicated by 
Harrison and Rutström’s (2009) observation that we may even have to switch between theories in order 
to account for the heterogeneity observed. 
8 It has been used to explain behavior in strategic games (Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2003), agricultural 
economics (Lusk and Coble, 2005), risky settings outside the lab (Harrison, List and Towe, 2007), and 
setups relating risk attitudes and discounting (Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström, 2008).  
9 A variety of alternatives to HL, adopted by Wakker and Deneffe (1996), Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000), 
Abdellaoui (2000) and Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and Paraschiv (2007), use the trade-off method based on a 
series of binary choices between lotteries aiming at separating between attitudes toward consequences 
and attitudes toward probabilities. A second approach, adopted by Hey and Orme (1994), Camerer and 
Ho (1994), Carbone and Hey (2000) and Stott (2006) uses a large number of independent binary choices 
between lotteries to estimate risk attitudes. Both sets of procedures are specific to the EUT and are 
even more time-consuming and cognitively demanding for the subjects than the more frequently used 
HL procedure.  5 
 
identifying  other  biases
10  of  the  set  up,  have  created  an  –undesirable,  for  our  purposes– 
plethora of non comparable datasets. Contrary to the problem of non comparability among 
small data sets, several studies
11 use hypothetical simple questions among large and even 
international  samples,  which  however  have  not  been  used  to  explain  behavior  in  other 
contexts.  
A broadly used test among psychologists is Zukerman’s (1978) Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS) 
with  which  our  test  exhibits  some  correlation
12.  The  test  is  structured  as  a  YES-NO 
questionnaire on attitudes towards risky activities under four subscales separating subject’s 
riskiness  in  different  domains,  none  of  which  is  strictly  speaking  financial.  The  economic 
domain is used in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), introduced by Bechara, Damasio, Damasio and 
Anderson (1994). The task was originally aimed at measuring a subject’s difficulty to identify 
the most profitable deck, from which he or she should, thereafter, extract all cards. Using the 
task as an external risk attitude elicitation device implies significant loss of control, because it 
mixes risk preferences with a subject’s learning ability (a “slow” learner can be confused with a 
risk loving subject or one with low levels of loss aversion) and it does not fully account for 
different learning histories. For space reasons, we will not review other tests occasionally used 
to elicit risk attitudes as an explanatory factor of behavior in other contexts. Rather, we will 
risk a generalization. All existing tasks suffer from either lack of systematic replication in a 
stable format generating statistics with large comparable datasets, or they are insufficiently 
justified as measures of risk attitudes isolated from other parallel phenomena. Furthermore, 
they are all uni-dimensional.                  
 
3.  The SGG lottery-panel test  
 
The  SGG  lottery-panel  task  was  originally  used  to  study  risk  preferences  parallel  to 
cooperation/competition in prisoner’s dilemma games. Riskier subjects were found to be more 
cooperative. The task consists of four different panels, like those in Figure 1, every one of 
which contains ten different lotteries. In each lottery, subjects can win a payoff  ) (x  with a 
probability  ) (p  and otherwise nothing. 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Subjects choose (marking the preferred lottery as in the example of Figure 1) one of the ten 
lotteries from each panel. In the implementation of the task with real money, only one of 
these four panels, selected randomly at the end of the session, is used to determine a subject’s 
                                                           
10 See, for example, the work by Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre (2006) on the embedding bias induced 
by the fact that subjects tend to change their switching point when some extreme alternatives of binary 
choice are removed.  
11 See Wang, Rieger and Hens (2010) and Weber and Hsee (1998, 1999). 
12 This is based on small sample reported in Georgantzís, Genius, García-Gallego and Sabater-Grande 
(2003) in which only results from the first panel of the SGG test exhibited a weak correlation (-0.248) 
with SSS on the expected direction: more sensation seeking, riskier choices.   
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earnings in the experiment. The range of winning probabilities in all panels is the same (from 1 
to  0.1  in  steps  of  0.1).  The  payoff  associated  to  each  lottery’s  winning  probability  is 
constructed using the rule: 
 (3)      .
)· 1 (
)· 1 ( · ) (
ij
j ij j
ij j ij j ij ij ij p
t p c
x t p c x p L E
- +
= ⇒ - + = =
  
) ( ij L E  is the expected value of lottery  ij L , where  { } 10 ,..., 2 , 1 Î i  designates one of the 10 
lotteries offered in panel  { } 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 Î j . The parameter  j c  is a constant amount of money 
which is fixed for this dataset to 1€. The parameter  { } 10 , 5 , 1 , 1 . 0 Î j t  is a panel-specific risk 
premium, which generates an increase in the lotteries’ expected values as we move from safer 
to riskier options within the same panel. All the panels begin with a sure amount of 1€, which 
is increased as winning probabilities are decreased, resulting in increments of expected values 
as we move from left to right within each panel. These increments are larger as we move from 
panel 1 to panel 4. This structure implies that more risk-averse subjects choose lotteries closer 
to the left of a panel.
13 All risk neutral and risk loving subjects should choose the lotteries at 
the far right extreme of the panels.  
Considering the fact that with 4 choices the researcher obtains 4 different observations (as 
opposed to 10 choices for 1 observation in HL) per individual subject, we can easily see that 
the test parsimoniously produces a panel rather than a single column of data. By definition, 
this corresponds to a multi-dimensional description of individual attitudes towards risk. 
  
3.1 A large dataset 
 
Since its first implementation, the SGG test has been used in several occasions producing 
various small experimental datasets.
14 Here, we report results from a large dataset
15 (N=785) 
obtained under comparable conditions, paying special attention to the bi-dimensional nature 
of  decision making  and  its  implications  for  the  explanation  of  behavior  in other  contexts. 
                                                           
13 In terms of EUT, García-Gallego, Georgantzís, Navarro-Martínez and Sabater-Grande (forth.) observe 












makes  choices  which  associate  higher  risk  aversion  parameters  r  to  safer  choices  in  each  panel. 
Furthermore, for a given risk aversion parameter, weakly monotonic transitions towards riskier choices 
are predicted as we move from panel 1 to panel 4.   
14 Brañas-Garza, Guillén and López del Paso (2008) have shown that choices in the test do not correlate 
with subjects’ mathematical skills. García-Gallego, Georgantzis, Martínez Navarro and  Sabater-Grande 
(2010) warn us that repeated implementation without any intermediate treatment generates regression 
to the mean phenomena. Implementation by Brañas-Garza, Georgantzís and Guillén (2007) in a gambler 
anonymous session among pathological gamblers and their spouses captures an unprecedented risk-
averse behavior by the latter. Earlier, Georgantzís et al. (2003) had studied the effect on choices of 
knowing expected utility theory and hypothetical vs. real monetary rewards. 
15 Between 2003 and 2008, at the Laboratori d’Economia Experimental (Universitat Jaume I, Castellón-
Spain). 7 
 
Figure 2 depicts the frequency of choices when all data from all panels are pooled together. 
Given the variation in prizes and payment methods, this image corresponds to what could be 
seen as a randomized experiment over the probability space. The peak on the certain payoff 
captures a certainty effect. A peak on the other extreme (p=0.1) as well as a valley on p=0.9 
are both compatible with over-(under-) weighting of small (large) probabilities predicted in PT.  
Strong  attraction  of  choices  towards  the  “center”  (p=0.5)  may  be  the  result  of  subjects’ 
familiarity with the p=½ probability or simply because of an embedding bias similar to that 
reported  by  Bosch-Domènech  and  Silvestre  (2006)  on  HL.  No  matter  what  causes  this 
attraction to the center, this property favors close-to-normal distributions of the resulting 
variable, making it appropriate for simple OLS regressions.     
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
In Figure 3 we present the same dataset broken down by panel, gender and reward method 
(hypothetical, N=384; real money, N=401). Males are less risk-averse than females. However, 
males and females behave in more different ways when playing hypothetical lotteries than real 
ones. Actually, with real rewards, mean choice varies significantly across genders only in panel 
3  and  4  (2.7  and  3.9  percentage  points  at  5%  and  1%  confidence  level,  respectively). 
Responsiveness  to  risk-premium  increases,  captured  by  choice  variation  across  panels,  is 
similar for males and females. Specifically, when faced with hypothetical payoffs, both males 
and females make less risk-averse choices, the higher the reward, while, counterintuitively
16, 
when playing with real payoffs, riskier choices are observed in panels with lower risk-returns.   
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
We have argued that it should be a main concern for experimentalists and decision theorists 
whether  a  subject’s  decision  under  one  condition  meaningfully  relates  to  behavior  under 
another condition.  
 
FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
Figures 4 and 5 present an aspect of behavior which is missed by other tests. Each graph 
presents the joint density of individual choices across panel pairs. Each color represents a 
percentage,  i.e.  the  proportion  of  subjects  whose  choice  combinations  in  each  panel  pair 
correspond to that specific chart label. Higher risk aversion in one panel predicts a higher risk 
aversion in another and, at the same time, reactions to the variation of risk returns across 
different panels seem to be rather moderate.  
 
FIGURE 5 HERE 
                                                           
16 Although Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1998) have already explained the negative correlation between 
firm-level risk taking and risk-return, using Prospect Theory and firm specific target profits.  8 
 
 
As expected, reactions are more visible across more “distant panels”, showing that a bigger 
shock is necessary to guarantee a change of choices. This within-subject pattern reproduces in 
a more reliable way what we have already observed, namely, that the use of real rewards 
makes subjects to switch to safer options in the presence of higher returns to risk. 
 
 
3.2 Principal Component Analysis 
 
It is clear that multidimensional descriptions of risk attitudes require obtaining more than one 
choice per individual. This is done by the SGG test through the use of the four panels. However 
we have not shown yet that, first, the additional information obtained significantly improves 
the description of behavior and, second, that this improvement leads to a higher power of our 
task to explain behavior in other contexts. 
 
We use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to construct two synthetic variables (the first two 
components) capturing 85% of subjects’ choice variance. These variables have the following 
advantages:    (1)  they  are  subject  to  economic  interpretation  and,  (2)  since  they  are  by 
construction orthogonal among each other, they can be used as explanatory variables of the 
same model. Intuitively, the first component can be interpreted as an arithmetic mean of 
choices across the four panels given that the loads of each panel in this component are similar 
and of the same sign. The second component involves a juxtaposition of panels 1 and 2 on one 
hand and 3 and 4 on the other, which can intuitively be seen as a measure of sensitivity to risk-
premium variations. As observed in Table 1, the component is loaded more by the extreme 
panel 1 (negatively) and 4 (positively) than by choice differences across the adjacent panels, 2 
and 3. Intuitively, the first component is increasing in the average probability of the lottery 
chosen in the four panels and can be seen as a standard measure of risk aversion. The second 
component can be seen as a measure of a subject’s sensitivity to variations in the return to risk 
in the “counterintuitive” direction of lower risk taking in the presence of higher returns to risk. 
While this confirms our comments on Figures 4 and 5, it provides a formal motivation for the 
use of bi-dimensional descriptions of risk attitudes, summarized as individual choice averages 
and choice variability across contexts (panels).  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
FIGURE 6 HERE 
Using these two components we reconsider gender and hypothetical/real reward effects. It 
can be seen on Figure 6 that gender differences are specific to the first component, while they 
diminish or even vanish in the second component. Therefore, males are less risk averse than 
females but both genders are similar in terms of their sensitivity to variations in the return to 
risk.  Regarding  differences  between  hypothetical  and  real  rewards,  both  components  are 
relevant.  According  to  the  first  component,  subjects  make  safer  choices  in  hypothetical 9 
 
lotteries, while, according to the second component they switch more across panels with real 
rewards, but opposite to the expected pattern of riskier choices for higher risk-returns. 
 
3.3 Using the SGG test to explain behavior: An example. 
García-Gallego,  Georgantzís,  Pereira  and  Pernías-Cerrillo  (2005)  conducted  experiments  on 
pricing where firms have some captive clients and they also compete for informed consumers 
using price comparisons on the Internet. During 50  periods, subjects face the dilemma of 
setting high prices to benefit from captive clients or lower prices to compete for informed 
consumers too. Parallel to the main experiment controlling for more and less competitive 
markets  and  complete  or  incomplete  price  indexing  (Treatments  T1-T4),  the  SGG  risk 
elicitation task was implemented with hypothetical rewards.  
Following  the  estimates  on  Table  2  and  abstracting  from  the  specifics  of  the  main 
experiment,
17 we see that risk attitudes provide significant explanatory power for the pricing 
behavior  observed.  In  fact,  both  first  and  second  principal  components  are  necessary  to 
identify the effect of risk attitudes on pricing behavior. On one hand, the first component 
capturing safe choices is associated to more competitive pricing. That is, more risk-averse 
subjects set lower prices in order to avoid the risk of not having the lowest price indexed by 
the engine. On the other hand, the second principal component is also associated with lower 
pricing.  This  means  that  subjects,  recognizing  the  increased  profitability  of  riskier  choices 
across panels, also realize that setting higher prices guarantees profits which do not depend on 
the excessive randomness of the search process. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
4.  Conclusions 
 
We have discussed the properties of risk attitudes as captured by the SGG elicitation task. The 
danger of using unidimensional descriptions of risk attitudes goes beyond the incompatibility 
with modern  economic theories  like  PT,  CPT etc.,  all  of which  call  for  tests with multiple 
degrees  of  freedom.  Faithfull  to  this  prescription,  the  contribution  of  this  paper  is  an 
empirically  and  endogenously  determined  bi-dimensional  specification  of  risk  attitudes, 
sufficient to describe behavior under uncertainty and necessary to explain behavior in other 
contexts. 
   
                                                           
17 Apart from the expected effect of firm number on prices, the model identifies a decreasing time trend 




A1: Instructions  
In this experiment you can earn a certain amount of money which depends 
on your decisions and luck. 
Decision (please mark with an X in one of the empty cells of each panel): 
In this task we ask you to choose one of the ten alternatives of each panel. Each alternative is 
a lottery defined as a combination of the probability of winning and of the amount (in euros) 
you will earn if the favorable result occurs. If the favorable result does not occur, you get 
nothing. In the case of choosing the probability 1 (with payoff equal to 1€), this choice implies 
that you will be paid 1€ for sure. 
Your earnings: 
How much are you going to earn in this experiment is going to be determined in two steps: 
·  Step 1: A 4-sided die is tossed.  The number: 1, 2, 3 ó 4, determines the panel in 
which your decision will be taken into account in step 2. 
·  Step 2: A 10-sided die is tossed. Note that: The 10 side numbers are: 0, 1, 2, 3, 
4,…, 8 or 9. The number shown by the die determines the upper limit of winning 
numbers. If, for example,  the  die shows an  8,  all  numbers except  9  win. Thus, 
everyone gets the prize that corresponds to the chosen lottery, except for those 
ones that played the 10% lottery (i.e. they chose the option 0.1)18. The ones that 
play the 20% lottery need at least an 8. The ones choosing 0,3 (30%) need at least 
a 7 to win. And so on and so forth. 
 
EXAMPLE: How much would you get if…?  
If, in panel 1, you choose, for example, the lottery whose winning probability is 0.7, you will  
get the corresponding prize unless the sides with numbers 0, 1 or 2 are shown by the 10-sided 
die. That is, you win if one of the highest seven numbers is shown by the die (9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4 or 
3). Following the same reasoning, if you choose the lottery with winning probability 0,5 (50%), 
you get the corresponding prize as far as one the 5 highest numbers (9, 8, 7, 6 or 5) is shown 
by the 10-sided die, while you get nothing in case the die shows numbers 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4.  
   
                                                           
18 Those win only in the case the die shows a 9. 11 
 
Observe the following 4 panels and take your decision. Remember that you must choose one 




Prob.  1  0,9  0,8  0,7  0,6  0,5  0,4  0,3  0,2  0,1 
€  1,00  1,10  1,30  1,50  1,70  2,10  2,70  3,60  5,40  10,90 
Choice                     
 
Panel 2 
Prob.  1  0,9  0,8  0,7  0,6  0,5  0,4  0,3  0,2  0,1 
€  1,00  1,20  1,50  1,90  2,30  3,00  4,00  5,70  9,00  19,00 
Choice                     
 
Panel 3 
Prob.  1  0,9  0,8  0,7  0,6  0,5  0,4  0,3  0,2  0,1 
€  1,00  1,70  2,50  3,60  5,00  7,00  10,00  15,00  25,00  55,00 
Choice                     
 
Panel 4 
Prob.  1  0,9  0,8  0,7  0,6  0,5  0,4  0,3  0,2  0,1 
€  1,00  2,20  3,80  5,70  8,30  12,00  17,50  26,70  45,00  100,00 




    
 
A2: Figures  
 
Figure 1. The SGG lottery
 
Figure 2.  Histogram of subjects’ pooled probability choices across all panels and implementation conditions.
 
 
The SGG lottery-panel test and example of subject choices. 
 
Histogram of subjects’ pooled probability choices across all panels and implementation conditions.
12 
Histogram of subjects’ pooled probability choices across all panels and implementation conditions.  
Figure 3.  Histograms of subjects’ probability choices by panel, implementation conditions and gender. Histograms of subjects’ probability choices by panel, implementation conditions and gender.
13 
 
Histograms of subjects’ probability choices by panel, implementation conditions and gender. 14 
 
 
Figure 4. Subject’s choices across panel pairs for hypothetical payoff lotteries. Legend percentage ranges refer to 






















































































































































































































































































0.0%-2.0% 2.0%-4.0% 4.0%-6.0% 6.0%-8.0%15 
 
 
Figure 5. Subjects’ choices across panel pairs for real payoff lotteries. Legend percentage ranges refer to 
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Table 2. Random effects GLS regression: Pricing explained by risk attitudes. 
   
Component Cumulative %
Comp. 1 2.742 *** 68.54 68.54
Comp. 2 0.670 *** 16.75 85.29
Comp. 3 0.307 *** 7.67 92.96



























dummy_loose (t-1) 95.09 *** 5.63
period -1.55 *** 0.18
dummy_t1 73.63 *** 18.54
dummy_t2 68.10 *** 18.59
dummy_t3 -4.57 18.64
pc1_scores -7.54 * 4.02
pc2_scores -20.24 *** 6.95
constant 461.70 *** 14.53
Number of obs  =  8820
Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects
chi2(1) = 13584.52
Prob > chi2 =     0.0000
(*) significant at 10% confidence level, (**) significant at 5% confidence level, 
(***) significant at 1% confidence level.
Coefficient
Number of groups =   18018 
 
A4: Utility and probability-weighting function estimation: An 
econometric approach 
 
Although the test is not designed to be used as a method of mapping decisions into parameter 
spaces, the results obtained here can be used to estimate probability weighting and utility 
function  parameters,  as  is  often  done  with other  tests  of  risk  attitudes  based  on  choices 
among different probability-prize combinations. We present here the results from such an 
exercise, based, among others, on Abdellaoui et al. (2010) and Harrison and Rutström (2009). 
We estimate maximum likelihood models, adapting the structural model of binary choice to 
the context of choices among more than two alternatives. 
Firstly,  we  estimate  a  standard  Constant  Relative  Risk  Aversion  (CRRA)  utility  function, 
assuming expected utility theory (EUT). We assume that utility is defined by 
      =
  
     
1 −  
+              
Where,     is the lottery prize of lottery j,  α is the parameter to be estimated and  ε  is 
unobserved stochastic influences. Under EUT, the value associated with the lottery satisfies: 
 
        =   
  
     
1 −  
  
Given  the  observed  choices    ,  the  subjects’  probability  of  selecting  the  choice  category 
represented by    =   over all other choice categories is: 
 
     =  |  ,  =        >       ∀  ≠   .    
 
Assuming  that  ε   is  independently  and  identically  distributed  (IID)  according  to  a  logistic 
distribution,  
     =  |  ,  =
     
∑        
   
 
 
the log likelihood of the multinomial logit model is:  
lnℒ = 
 
   
     ln  
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.   
Secondly, we estimate maximum likelihood models, assuming Rank Dependent Utility Theory 
(RDUT). We consider the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) probability weighting function: 
 
   =
  
 
   








Under RDUT, the value associated with a lottery X satisfies: 
 
      =   
  
     
1 −  
  
We estimate the models using the clustering method that allow us the possibility of correlation 
between responses by the same subject. The standard errors on estimates are corrected for 
the possibility that the 4 responses are clustered for the same subject. 
 
Estimation results are reported below in Table A1. All coefficients reported are significant at 
1% confidence level. Under EUT, the CRRA coefficient is 0.64 that indicates that our subjects 
are risk averse. Under RDUT, the CRRA coefficient is again 0.64, which implies that our utility 
estimates are consistent across different theories, while the probability weighting function 
parameter  is  less  than  1  and  very  close  to  previous  estimates  obtained  in  Tversky  and 
Kahneman (1992) and several other studies thereafter. 
 
 
  Expected Utility  Rank-Dependent Utility 
  Coefficient  Std. Errors  Coefficient  Std. Errors 
α  0.64***  0.00  0.64***  0.00 
γ      0.68***  0.00 
Subjects    785 
N            3140 
(***)significant at 1% confidence level 
 
Table A1.Parameters estimates of Expected Utility and Rank-Dependent Utility theories 
 
As  shown  in  Figure  A1,  the  estimated  probability-weighting  function  has  the  usual  shape 
corresponding  to overestimation  of  small  probabilities  and  underestimation  of  large ones. 
Thus, our results can be easily used to infer parameter estimates corresponding to our subject’ 
choices,  although,  as  mentioned  in  the  main  text,  the  relevant  dimensions  relevant  for 
empirical analysis aimed at explaining behavior in other contexts are those corresponding to 




Figure A1. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) probability weighting function. 
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